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Abstract—Game theoretical approaches are widely used for the 
analysis of oligopolistic electricity markets. Nash equilibrium is 
a solution concept of game theoretical approaches. Due to 
existence of mixed strategy equilibrium and large number of 
multiple players, finding Nash equilibrium for problems in 
electricity market is a difficult task. To resolve these difficulties, 
this paper proposes a simplified approach for finding extreme 
Nash equilibrium, based on payoff matrix approach and mixed 
integer linear programming (MILP). To illustrate the proposed 
approach, a practical case study of Cournot poly-matrix game is 
considered. Eliminating constraints are appended on the 
proposed approach to find a global optimal solution. Obtained 
results show the strength of proposed approach, in terms of 
simplicity and computational time.    
Index Terms—Electricity market, poly-matrix game, Nash 
equilibrium, payoff matrix approach, mixed-integer linear 
programming. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electric power sector is being restructured for improving 
operational efficiency and enhancing consumer benefits. This 
introduces competition between generation companies and 
retailers. In a fully competitive market, market clearing price 
is always close to generator’s marginal cost and there is no 
scope for market power. However, electricity markets are 
oligopolistic in nature, due to limited number of market 
participants and other operational constraints. In oligopolistic 
electricity markets, strategic behavior of dominating 
generation companies increases their expected profit. 
Therefore, market price is higher than expected, and is 
undesirable. To prevent dominating generation companies to 
abuse market power, forecasting of future market outcomes is 
essential [1]. 
Game theory is an appropriate tool to model strategic 
behavior of dominating participants in the market. Each 
strategic firm in the game acts as a player, and has a set of 
strategies. Players select the strategy to be offered in the 
market, which gives them maximum payoff, depending on 
other players’ strategies. Among the variety of game 
theoretical models, Cournot and Supply function equilibrium 
are the most popular for modeling oligopolistic electricity 
markets [2]. Solution of any game theoretical model is Nash 
equilibrium is a stable point of game where none of the player 
is interested to change its strategy unilaterally. This paper 
aims to find Nash equilibrium for a game that represents 
electricity market in an efficient and simplified manner.   
Due to transmission constraints, and nonlinear and non-
convex payoff, finding Nash equilibrium for games related to 
electricity markets are difficult. Various approaches proposed 
to find Nash equilibrium are broadly classified into three 
categories:  mathematical programming approaches [3-5], co-
evolutionary approaches [6-7] and payoff matrix approaches 
[8-10]. In mathematical programming approaches, equilibrium 
problem is formulated as an optimization problem, and then 
solved using iterative and optimization techniques. Cournot 
Nash equilibrium in both bilateral and pool based electricity 
market is obtained by linear complementarity approach [3]. 
Individual strategic bidding problem formulated as a 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints can be 
solved by interior point algorithm [4]. Equilibrium problem 
with equilibrium constraints transform into mixed integer 
linear programming problem using binary expansion approach 
[5]. This type of approach can be used for finding multiplayer 
game Nash equilibrium. However, iterative techniques have 
convergence difficulties and optimization techniques may 
provide local optimal solution that is not a true Nash 
equilibrium. In addition, these types of approaches are suitable 
only for finding pure strategy equilibrium.     
The co-evolutionary programming approaches employ 
artificial intelligence based optimization techniques for 
finding Nash equilibrium [6-7]. These approaches effectively 
deal with transmission constrained non-convex payoff. 
However, co-evolutionary programming approaches are 
designed for finding only pure strategy equilibrium and not for 
mixed strategy equilibrium.    
Payoff matrix approaches can find global solution and are 
suitable for both pure and mixed strategy equilibrium. To 
reduce the size of payoff matrix, continuous strategies must be 
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discretized. Several heuristic based on payoff matrix approach 
have been used to solve three-player Cournot and Bertrand 
game [9]. Nash equilibrium condition of payoff matrix is 
characterized by the polynomial equations that are solved by 
homotopy continuation algorithm [10]. Approaches proposed 
in [9-10] are complicated, intuitional and do not provide 
optimal Nash equilibrium.  
This paper presents a solution method to find extreme 
Nash equilibrium of poly-matrix games using payoff matrix 
approach and mixed integer linear programming (MILP). 
Nash equilibrium is extreme because it is expressed as a 
solution of optimization problem. Linearization technique is 
employed to transform the equilibrium problem into MILP 
problem. Two numerical examples, one involving bi-matrix 
game and other poly-matrix game, are considered to test the 
proposed approach. Results obtained from the proposed 
method are verified with approaches proposed in [9] and 
GAMBIT [15].  
   Rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, 
the basic poly-matrix game formulation and Nash equilibrium 
are described. Section III provides MILP formulation of 
payoff matrix approach and the simulation procedure. Section 
IV includes numerical and graphical results of testing the 
proposed approach through a comprehensive analysis on bi-
matrix and poly-matrix game. In Section V, relevant 
conclusions are drawn. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. Polymatrix Cournot Game 
A poly-matrix game is a normal form multi-player non-
cooperative game. If players compete in game based on their 
production quantity, games become poly-matrix Cournot 
game. In this type of game, each player (Firm) selects its 
production level assuming known and constant behavior of 
rival players. Let { }1,2,......,N n=  be a set of players that 
participate strategically in electricity market. The cost 
function of each firm is expressed as: 
( ) ( )21 0;2i gi i gi i gi i iC P a P b P C a i N= + + > ∈                  (1)             
where, giP is the output power of 
thi power producer in 
MW, and ia , ib , ic are the cost coefficients. Players select 
their offered power between minimum giP and maximum 
giP generation limit in MW defined as: 
 gi gi giP P P i N≤ ≤ ∈                                                     (2)                                                  
The sum of offered power of each firm is assumed equal 
to the total market demand, neglecting transmission losses 
such that  
1
P
d gi
i
P P
=
=∑                                                                     (3)                                                                 
Market price λ in $/MWh depends on total demand and is 
uniform for each node of the system. The relationship 
between price and demand is represented by inverse linear 
demand curve, and is expressed as: 
n dPλ θ ρ= −   (4)                     
where, ( )$/MWhθ and ( )2$/MW hρ are demand benefit 
coefficients.  Marginal cost of generators can be defined as: 
( )i gi i gi iMC P a P b= +                                                     (5)                     
Marginal cost of generators is equal to the market clearing 
price, when no generation capacity constraints and 
transmission constraints are considered.  
B. Equilibrium Problem Formulation 
Let us consider that each player i  has a finite set of pure 
strategies { }1 2, ,... iki i i iS s s s= , where, ik  is the total number of 
strategies. Payoff of player i  for each strategy is calculated 
using the following expression 
( ) ( )1 2, ,... iki i i n gi i giia s s s P C Pλ= −                                  (6)                      
Payoff matrix iA  consists of payoff for player i for each 
strategic combination. If player i chooses his strategy kis  and 
player j chooses his strategy ljs , a partial payoff ( ),k lij i ja s s is 
assigned for player i . Therefore, for any pure strategic choice 
( )1 ,.......,k lns s of the n  players, overall payoff of player i  at 
the end of game is 
( ) ( )1 ,...... ,k l k li n ij i j
j i
A s s a s s
≠
=∑                                       (7)                      
For a mixed strategy game, let iX be a probability vector 
over the set of pure strategy iS having following condition: 
{ }: 1, 0ti i i iS X e X X= = ≥?                                             (8)                      
At the end of poly-matrix game, overall payoff of player 
i is 
( ) ( )Ti i ij j
j i
R X X A X
≠
= ∑                                               (9)                      
In a poly-matrix game, tuplen − ( )* * *1 ,........, nX X X= of 
the mixed strategy is called Nash equilibrium if and only if, 
for any other tuplen − ( )* * * * *1 1 1,....., , , ...,i i i nX X X X X X− += , 
satisfy following condition: 
( ) ( )* * *T Ti ij j i ij j
j i j i
X A X X A X i N
≠ ≠
≥ ∀ ∈∑ ∑              (10)           
The proof of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
existence in finite multi-player games can be found in [11-
12].  
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION APPROACH   
A. MILP Formulation 
The problem of poly-matrix Nash equilibrium is 
expressed in (10). This is transformed to MILP problem using 
linearization techniques [13-14]. The payoff maximization 
objective of player i shown in ( )8 and ( )9 can be 
transformed into linear minimization objective using duality 
theory.  
{ }min :
i
i
i i ij je A Xγ
γ γ ≥                                                (11)                                               
where, iγ is a dual objective variable of player i , and equal 
to its primal payoff ( )Ti i ij j
j i
X A Xγ
≠
= ∑ . The final 
optimization problem to find Nash equilibrium can be 
formulated as follows:  
,
min
i i
iX i Nγ
γ
∈
∑                                                                   (12)                                                               
Subject to 
1ti i
i N
e X
∈
=∑                                                                     (13)                                                                  
:
0i i ij j i i
j N j i
e A X M Uγ
∈ ≠
− − ≤∑                                     (14)                                  
i i iX U e+ ≤                                                                     (15)                                                                  
{ }0,1iU =                                                                       (16)                                                                                                                     
0iX ≥                                                                             (17)                                                                                                                             
0jX ≥                                                                            (18)                                                                                                                              
iγ ∈?                                                                             (19)                                                                          
Objective function ( )12  is equal to the sum of players 
expected payoff. Constraint ( )13 ensures that sum of 
probability of mixed strategy is always equal to one.  
Equation ( )14 constitutes the complementarity slackness 
conditions of objective. In this condition, iM  is constant, and 
should be large enough, as obtained by the following 
expression: 
 
, :, :
max mini ij iji j I i ji j I i j
M a a
∈ ≠∈ ≠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠                                    (20)                                  
Inequality constraint ( )16 shows that the sum of pure 
mixed strategy variable and binary variable is always less 
than unity. The solution of formulated MILP problem in (12)-
(19) may be local optima. To find global optimal solution, 
eliminate constraints added on formulated MILP problem. 
{ } { }1 1 0
1
N
U U L i Ni i
i
+ − ≤ ∀ ∈
=
∑                                          (21)                                       
1
1
N
i
i
M
L N
=
= +
∑
                                                           (22)                                                      
This constraint eliminates the binary variable 
combinations found in initial equilibrium solution.  
B. Simulation Procedure  
This section describes the simulation procedure used to 
obtain extreme Nash equilibrium by the proposed approach. 
Step 1: Model initialization: Define the number of 
generation companies that participate as a strategic 
player in the electricity market poly-matrix game. 
Collect their cost parameters and respective demand 
benefit coefficients.  
Step 2: Define strategy set: Continuous pure strategy set of 
players is defined between their maximum and 
minimum capacity. Using discretization continuous 
strategy set transform into discrete strategy set.    
Step 3: Payoff matrix construction: For each strategy 
combination, market-clearing price and players’ 
profit is calculated using (1)-(6). Then construct a 
payoff matrix of each player to have their profit for 
all strategy of opponents.  
Step 4: MILP formulation: When all players’ payoff matrix 
is constructed, then transpose equilibrium problem 
in MILP using (12)-(21). 
Step 5: Nash equilibrium: Solution of MILP using any 
commercial MILP solver provides Nash equilibrium.  
Step 6: Add elimination constraints: To check whether 
obtained Nash equilibrium is local or global optimal, 
add elimination constraints (21)-(22) on formulated 
MILP in (12)-(19). Again, run MILP solver to obtain 
new Nash equilibrium. 
Step 7: Check global optimal: If new Nash equilibrium 
obtained in Step 6 is equal to old Nash equilibrium 
obtained in Step 5, this means global optimal 
equilibrium is achieved, then go to next Step. If new 
Nash equilibrium differs from old Nash equilibrium, 
it means solution is local optimal, so go to Step 6. 
Step 8: End 
IV.  CASE STUDY 
To illustrate the proposed solution approach, two cases 
are considered. Case I is a bi-matrix Cournot game and Case 
II is a poly-matrix Cournot game. 
A. Case I: Bimatix Cournot Game 
In this case, two generators 1G and 2G compete in 
oligopolistic market to meet demand. The strategic behavior 
of generators is modeled as a strategic player in a bi-matrix 
Cournot game. Fig. 1 shows system configuration and 
provides information about generators’ location and network 
constraints.  
 
Figure 1.  Two bus system. 
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In this case, generators’ minimum and maximum 
generation capacity is considered as 0 MW and 100 MW 
respectively. The marginal cost of generators is assumed, as 
$10/MWh for generator 1G  and $20/MWh for generator 2G . 
Players’ discrete strategy set are formulated by an 
increment of 10 MW from generators’ minimum to maximum 
limit. Therefore, each generator has 10 strategies to offer in 
the market. Demand is equal to the sum of generators offered 
power.   
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Figure 2.  Generators expected payoff. 
Demand benefit coefficients θ and ρ are equal to 100 and 
0.5 respectively. The size of payoff matrix for this game 
is10 10× . The player’s expected payoff corresponds to their 
pure strategies, as shown in Fig. 2. Large coefficients 1M and 
2M values are equal to 4600 and 4800 for player 1G and 
2G payoff, respectively. Nash equilibrium obtained by the 
proposed approach results in an offer of 60 MW for 1G and 50 
MW for 2G , in the absence of network limits. 
B. Case II: Polymatrix Cournot Game 
 
Figure 3.  Three bus system. 
In this case, three generators 1G , 2G  and 3G  strategically 
interact in oligopolistic electricity market. Their strategic 
interaction represents a poly-matrix Cournot game. For this 
case, system configuration is shown in Fig. 3. The 
transmission lines are assumed to be lossless and have equal 
reactance. Line flow is obtained using DC power flow 
solution.  Details about generators cost coefficients are 
provided in Table I.  
TABLE I.  GENERATORS COST COEFFICIENTS (SOURCE: TABLE 1, [8]) 
Generator G1 G2 G3 
Cost coefficient ( )2$/MW ha  0.015718 0.021052 0.012956 
Cost coefficient ( )$/MWhb  1.360575 -2.07807 8.105354 
Cost coefficient ( )$/hc  9490.366 11128.95 6821.482 
 
Demand benefit coefficients θ and ρ are 106.1176 and 
0.0206, respectively. Minimum and maximum limit of each 
generator is considered as 600 MW and 1500 MW, 
respectively. The discrete strategy set of each player is 
formulated by discretization of 100 MW in the range 
600~1500 MW. The size of payoff matrix for this game 
is10 10 10× × . The expected player’s payoff corresponding to 
their pure strategies is shown in Fig. 4. Large coefficients 1M , 
2M and 3M  are equal to 59263.356, 61520.718 and 
61073.012 for player 1G , 2G and 3G payoff, respectively. Nash 
equilibrium obtained by the proposed approach results in 
1G offering 1100 MW, 2G offering 1000 MW and 3G  offering 
1000 MW in the absence of network limits. The obtained 
results are similar to unconstrained case of [9].   
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Figure 4.  Generators expected payoff. 
To minimize computational effort, payoff matrix 
construction and power flow operation is performed in 
MATLAB platform. MILP problem have been solved using 
CPLEX 12.0 under GAMS. All simulations are performed on 
a Windows based Personal Computer, 1.73 GHz processor 
and 2.0 GB RAM. 
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TABLE II.  COMPUTATIONAL TIME REQUIREMENTS 
Approach Dimension Computation Time (Sec.)
Proposed Approach 10 10 10× ×  0.109 
GAMBIT [15] 10 10 10× ×  2250 
 
Comparison of computational time taken by the proposed 
approach with others is shown in Table II. Visualization of 
this table shows that proposed approach takes only 0.109 
seconds without elimination of dominated strategies. Solution 
of Case I bi-matrix game is obtained in 0.016 seconds.      
V. CONCLUSION  
The competition between strategic power producers in an 
oligopolistic electricity markets is generally modeled through 
game theoretical or equilibrium models. Due to presence of 
multiple strategic power producers in electricity markets 
finding Nash equilibrium is difficult task. This paper 
proposes a payoff matrix and MILP based solution approach 
for finding extreme Nash equilibrium of a poly-matrix game. 
Proposed approach has been tested on case studies of bi-
matrix and poly-matrix game. Simplicity, solvability and less 
computational time are the advantages of proposed approach. 
Implementation on larger systems, with size reduction 
techniques, is a major aspect to be investigated in future.     
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